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Supervisory control and data acquisition systems are extensively used in the
critical infrastructure domain for controlling and managing large-scale industrial
applications. This thesis presents a security management structure developed to protect
ICS networks from security intrusions. This structure is formed by a combination of
several modules for monitoring system-utilization parameters, data processing, detection
of known attacks, forensic analysis to support against unknown attacks, estimation of
control system-specific variables, and launch of appropriate protection methods. The best
protection method to launch in case of an attack is chosen by a multi-criteria analysis
controller based on operational costs and efficiency. A time-series ARIMA model is
utilized to estimate the future state of the system and to protect it against cyber intrusions.
Signature and performance based detection techniques assist in real-time identification of
attacks with little or no human intervention. Simulation results for Scanning, Denial of
Service and Injection attacks are provided.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Industrial Control Systems (ICS) were introduced due to the need to monitor,
control, and administer critical processes in large scale industrial systems. The
development of ICS was aimed at building command and control networks that
automatically execute a chain of actions on a device producing a specific end product [1].
The first generation ICS is comprised of simple point-to-point computer networks
connecting a monitoring device to sensors for supervising control processes.
Expanding the scope of point-to-point topology, networks like Advanced
Research Project Agency Network (ARPANET) and Usenet were developed to facilitate
communication between several computers. These networks supported basic end user
interaction. Due to the increasing number of networks, the Internet protocol suite was
developed to unify them. The system of these unified networks was called the Internet[2].
By the end of the 20th century, use of the Internet spread widely. In a short span,
devices capable of accessing the Internet were deployed into the existing ICS networks
for remote monitoring of processes. This enabled system administrators to control critical
processes via the Internet.
The remote monitoring and control of ICS network processes had raised security
concerns for the critical infrastructure sector. It was observed that ICS processes were
being attacked via the Internet. This was a concern because attackers were modifying
1

control processes leading to disruption in regular system operations. A disruption in
essential services provided by critical infrastructure industries can have a negative impact
on lives and property of a consideration section of population. The aforementioned risk
and the malicious intent of attackers increased the need to secure ICS.
Initially, the number of attacks experienced by ICS was small. This was because
accessing ICS devices over the Internet was a recent development and the associated
vulnerabilities were not fully explored. With an increase in the detected attacks, steps to
improve cyber security were taken. This led to the development of security solutions for
controlling cyber access to the network.
1.1

Background
The focus of this research is the improvement of security in Industrial Control

System (ICS). A Control System (CS) refers to a set of devices that maintains, regulates
and monitors the functioning of other devices in a network. An ICS administers and
controls processes from a central location. It incorporates different types of control
systems such as Process Control Systems (PCS), Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) and Distributed Control Systems (DCS). ICS is used in the critical
infrastructure sector to execute operations because of its efficient network designs and
use of automated algorithms[3].
Critical infrastructure is a term used for networks, systems, and assets, whether
cyber or physical which are vital for the functioning of a nation’s economy. Governments
and society rely on the uninterrupted functioning of critical infrastructure facilities in
sectors such as food production, electrical power generation, water treatment, oil and gas,
transportation systems, and waste management[4].
2

1.1.1

ICS Network
Industrial control systems are used to monitor and control network processes and

ensure their proper functioning. Simple point-to-point ICS networks have evolved into
complex multi-node networks consisting of various types of control systems, bridging a
central server to multiple remote devices with a single communication line[5].
Control systems such as PCS, SCADA and DCS communicate with field devices
to gather data about industrial processes and record changes observed in them[6]. A
process control system regulates the flow of ICS processes based on data obtained from
network and system monitoring devices such as Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) and
Intelligent Electronic Device (IED). If a network device fails, PCS analyzes the impact of
this failure on other devices in the network and makes necessary re-routing decisions [7].
Primarily PCS controls the flow of processes in a network while SCADA does
supervisory control by monitoring control network processes, gathering data from field
devices and facilitating remote monitoring of system parameters. SCADA stores process
parameters for real-time data management. These functions are accomplished using
devices like sensors, actuators, Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC), Human Machine
Interface (HMI), and Master Terminal Unit (MTU) deployed in the control network.
Distributed control system is another major component of the ICS network. DCS
scans and gathers information of ongoing processes in the system. It includes sensors,
actuators, and other communication devices. DCS communicates with field devices and
processes data received from them. It is also used to manage network processes
containing multiple variables and control loops.
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DCS is similar to a SCADA system in controlling, monitoring and managing
applications. Despite these similarities with SCADA systems, DCS is particularly distinct
in process goals, operational performance, and connectivity. Unlike a SCADA server, a
DCS directly connects to devices in the network and instantly polls them for control
process information. This reduces overhead costs of a fully integrated network [8].
Based on the ICS network requirements, devices deployed in the control system
configuration should have correct product specifications. Selecting the right kind of a CS
and functionalities saves an organization the expense of modifying the existing system
services.
1.1.2

Devices in a Typical ICS Network
An ICS network includes RTU, MTU, HMI, PLC, workstations, I/O controllers,

and Object Linking and Embedding for Process Control (OPC) servers. Various elements
of a network communicate with a server to supply data necessary for operation and
maintain integrity of process control throughout the system. Figure 1 demonstrates a
typical ICS network architecture showing devices deployed in the field network which
gather control data and interact with actuators, forwarding the collected data to the central
server[9].

4

Figure 1.1

A typical ICS Network

As shown in the figure, sensors and RTUs collect real-time process-specific data
such as voltage, pressure, water level etc. which is delivered to the central server for
process control. The collected real-time data in analog format is digitized by the RTUs.
This data is sent in the form of packets using communication channels such as internet,
wireless and satellites. Thus, RTUs are often referred to as remote station control devices
or field devices and continuously update PCS, DCS and SCADA network servers with
the current process values of the system[10].
Current RTU designs have complex hardware architecture and are compatible
with several protocols such as Distributed Network Protocol (DNP), Modbus and Bristol
5

Standard Asynchronous Protocol (BSAP)[11]. These can support multiple topology
configurations which includes point-to-point, point-to-multipoint, store and forward as
well as broadcast[12].
As shown in Figure 1, an MTU stores real-time data about processes executed at
the field site as received from RTUs. A MTU can be a central server or a group of
servers. Based on the input data obtained, MTU executes control decisions about
supervising processes [13]. It is configured to initiate a connection with RTU by
constantly polling it every few seconds for process information. This communication can
be established either by an operator or automatically.
Another crucial component of the ICS network is the HMI. It is a control panel
deployed in the SCADA network for interaction between an operator and the field
equipment. An HMI securely administers operations in a network and displays the
current process status as well as historical process related information within the layered
cyber-physical infrastructure. The display is made possible by first passing the raw data
through a data processing module for interpretation by the HMI. The display can be used
to alter setpoint values, manage algorithms, and adjust process parameters.
For a better understanding of the displayed information, an HMI is often deployed
with adaptive intelligent software agents used for data processing in real-time. Each agent
runs its own thread or is a part of multiple threads depending on the number of tasks it is
executing[9]. They are remotely accessible and are capable of responding to unusual
activity in the control network. In conclusion, an efficient HMI design reorganizes
available data to help comprehend and make control-specific decisions.
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In a real-time scenario, multiple RTUs communicate with one MTU, which then
connects to an HMI at a remote location updating it with the current process parameter
values of the system.
1.1.3

ICS Protocols
Communication between devices is handled by the protocol deployed in the

network. They are specifically designed for the transfer of control messages throughout
the network. Depending on the requirement of the client, several protocols have been
developed to support communication over serial, Local Area Network (LAN) and Wide
Area Network (WAN).
Protocols commonly used in the critical infrastructure sector such as oil and gas
include Modbus, Process Field Bus (PROFIBUS), DNP, and EtherNET/IP (Industrial
Protocol). These ICS network protocols are similar to Information Technology (IT)
protocols like Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
(SMTP), but have their own rules for client-server communications, timing, data
cryptography, and formatting[14].
From a technological perspective, ICS network protocols connect devices together
assuring reliability and integrity of data transmitted across the network. The choice of
protocol deployed in the ICS control network generally depends upon operating
requirements and the type of industry where it is used[15].
1.2

Motivation for Improving Security in ICS
In the past, ICS networks were designed to concentrate on maintaining the

reliability, confidentiality, and availability of process data. These traditional ICS
7

networks were not configured to update servers in a corporate network as they were
isolated from each other. Corporate networks are connected to the Internet and allow
administrators to monitor process parameters from a remote location. The need to
remotely supervise applications has led to the connection between the control and
corporate networks increasing vulnerabilities in the industrial environment.
Due to this connection, ICS network designs have become increasingly
complicated. A disruption in the operations of these devices can affect other components
of the control system at various levels. For instance, if an attack infects a computer in the
network, other devices connected to the victim machine can also get infected. Depending
on the processes being executed on the victim machine, an interruption can cause
different degrees of damage to the control system. Hence, countermeasures are required
to protect ICS from being compromised.
ICS has also started employing corporate protocols like TCP/IP and wireless
technologies like Bluetooth[9] adding to the network complexity. Due to added
functionalities and integration of the control network with the corporate network, the
current process parameters can be instantly updated on the application server. Although,
this supports remote accessibility, it also increases the scope of attacks. As a result,
security concerns of the corporate network were carried over to the ICS.
Vulnerabilities in the system along with increased complexities in the design
make it crucial to analyze every aspect of the network and formulate methods to protect it
against cyber attacks.

8

1.2.1

Threat Assessment
In a survey by the Homeland Security, it was found that more than fifty percent of

the critical infrastructure networks employing ICS were protected using weak default
passwords [16]. The finding raised serious security concerns prompting the government
to formulate the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, which identified ICS security as
a national priority [17]. It intended to trigger an increased effort towards protection
against cyber attacks in ICS networks.
According to a SANS SCADA and Process Control Security Survey (SysAdmin,
Audit, Networking and Security), there is an improvement in the level of awareness and
understanding of risks related to cyber intrusions [18]. Approximately 70% of the
respondents expect an increase in cyber threats in the future. Computer Emergency
Response Teams (CERT), which is an organization that gathers information on attacks
observed in ICS networks, has forecasted a growing risk of cyber security events,
particularly for the power sector[19]. All these emphasize the need to design cyber
solutions to protect ICS networks.
1.2.2

Attacks on ICS
In this section, we discuss a few attacks on critical infrastructure with relevant

examples. Several ICS vulnerabilities were not identified until infected systems were
detected and studied. Vulnerabilities in PLCs were identified when a computer worm
named Stuxnet attacked an Iranian air-gapped uranium resource. It contained a root kit to
compromise a PLC. In this attack, a flash drive with the worm was injected into a
network component using social engineering techniques. The worm spread throughout
the computing system accessing legitimate digital certificates. Then, Stuxnet sent false
9

instructions to the HMI to increase the operating speed of the Iranian IR-1 centrifuge
from its standard running frequency of 1,064 hertz to 1,410 hertz[20].
After Stuxnet, other worms like DuQu were found to attack ICS equipment. The
exploit was named DuQu as it recreated infected files with the extension “~DQ”. After
analysis of this worm, it was identified as a Remote Access Trojan (RAT) and did not
possess the skill to replicate. Further study of this worm revealed that it exploited
vulnerabilities in the open source software phpMyAdmin[21] and was primarily an
information gathering tool that did not disrupt network services[22].
The SCADA system of a public water utility in Springfield, Illinois was infected
by Russian attackers in 2011. The attack caused a water pump to malfunction due to
frequently turning it on and off. In this case, the impact of the attack was minimal
because the water utility used several water pumps. Further damage could have occurred
in the eventuality of all or various water pump failures.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) experienced a security breach in
June 2011 where username, password, and account details of several users got exposed.
Monitoring tools like Wireshark and other propriety analysis software were used to
expose the weak default passwords. An investigation of this attack showed that the
database server was exploited using techniques to reveal weak passwords to gather
confidential user information. Such events have elevated the concern for cyber security in
related critical infrastructure industries [23].
1.3

Autonomic Computing
Autonomic computing allows the automation of complex and time consuming

tasks in an ICS network and makes it capable of responding to user instructions[24]. It
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became necessary due to the need to accomplish both administrative and control actions
simultaneously in a network. The concept of autonomic computing was envisioned by
International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) in 2001[25].
1.3.1

Features of an Autonomic System
Autonomic computing refers to an intuitive and self-regulating system having

awareness, configuration, and adaptation features. Awareness is a feature where the
system is not only aware of its components, states, and processes, but is also aware of
changes in its environment. For example, in the event of an attack which attempts to
change a system parameter, the awareness feature of an autonomic system notices the
change in system activity and raises an alarm.
Configuration is another aspect of autonomic computing that handles installation
and setup of programs on devices in the network. For example, an autonomic system can
install and configure programs on itself and other devices depending on the operating
system, network environment and user requirements. Devices are configured without the
disruption of processes running on them. Hence, an autonomic system intelligently
upgrades its resources and configures itself based on high level goals without causing a
disruption in operations.
Adaptation is a feature enabling an autonomic system to alter control parameters
depending on its current state. It is adept in adding (or removing) devices from the
network and maintaining normal system operations without using all active resources in
the network. For instance, if a device on the network has failed, efficient re-routing
decisions are made to instantly regulate the traffic flow between master and slave
machines[26]. The autonomic system should be aware of its network topology to make
11

such re-routing decisions. Hence adaptation enables an autonomic computing system to
adapt to its working environment, adjusting to a different setup and unknown applications
without changing its configuration [27].
Additional features of an autonomic computing system aiding in the protection of
ICS networks include understanding the future state of the system, comprehending
communications with other systems to minimize data exchange, relieving system
administrators as well as diagnosing itself from internal failures.
1.3.2

Need for Autonomic Computing
With increasing complexity of modern ICS and limitations of human-in-the-loop

approach, it is expected that the loss on the frontier of cyber attacks will increase. Despite
the introduction of various security controls to mitigate vulnerabilities and protect ICS,
their reliability, maintainability, and availability are constantly prone to risk of an attack.
This demanded an immediate need to develop novel techniques using the concept of
autonomic computing to operate ICS equipment.
1.3.3

Application of Autonomic Computing
The basic concepts of the autonomic computing approach are summarized in

Figure 2. For example, consider a system executing risk assessment analysis and
penetration tests on its functions. A penetration test is an attack on the system aiming to
determine its vulnerabilities and weaknesses. If vulnerabilities are detected, methods such
as patch management and network threat assessment are developed to secure the system.
Depending on the type of attack used in the penetration test, counter measures are taken
by optimizing and configuring network resources. These corrective measures restore
12

normal operations in the network. This minimizes the impact of an attack. Hence, an
autonomic system can protect, configure, optimize, and heal itself from the detected
vulnerabilities.

Figure 1.2

Properties of an Autonomic Computing System

The autonomic computing concept is enhanced with the use of Recovery Oriented
Computing (ROC) implemented the realization of its self-healing characteristics. ROC is
a method which recognizes hardware and software bugs as unavoidable and uses methods
such as system partitioning to recover from system failures. ROC focuses on the recovery
of systems from failures rather than developing solutions for failure avoidance. It works
by identifying compromised devices and microrebooting[28] them in the event of an
attack. This prevents the attack from propagating and infecting other devices in the
13

network. If further required, an autonomic computing system can take the device offline
to diagnose and quarantine the detected threats. After diagnosis, the compromised device
is brought online for continued operation [29].
1.4

Contributions and Outline
Due to attacks like Stuxnet, which had a widespread impact, governments in

several countries realized that critical infrastructure equipment is poorly protected against
cyber-attacks. Following the Stuxnet, the Natanz nuclear site was attacked interrupting
Iran’s efforts towards developing nuclear power. Taking note of these events, the U.S.
government is trying to realize security solutions to protect critical infrastructure since
the Bush Administration. As a layer of protection, several organizations arrange for
backup servers at a remote site in case the server in the control network is compromised
or nonfunctional. An improved system was becoming necessary to actually protect the
control environment from an attack instead of providing a backup option[30].
As a consequence of challenges posed by threats, cyber security became a major
cause of concern. To thwart attacks, efforts are being taken to set up latest techniques to
stay abreast with current security controls vis-a-vis anti-virus software, firewalls, and
Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS). By realizing these solutions, ICS can be guarded to a
great extent. Current studies are concentrating on enlarging the scope of anomaly and
signature based Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for the detection and categorization of
cyber attacks.
In anomaly detection techniques, real-time system data is compared with normal
data to identify zero-day attacks whereas in signature-based IDSs, a set procedure is
adopted to check for known intrusions with minimum false positives[31].
14

This thesis proposes a comprehensive self-protecting security design which
identifies real-time cyber threats, examines unknown attack signatures, predicts
forthcoming attacks, and revises current algorithms to avoid disruption of normal system
operations and simultaneously improve SCADA security with or without human
intervention.
In this thesis, a model-based Autonomic Security Management (ASM) framework
monitoring ICS performance on real-time basis is presented. The proposed approach
includes prediction of cyber attacks that cause a disruption in the functioning of the
system. Real-time observations are analyzed to detect attacks by the IDS. To protect the
system against cyber attacks, eight protection mechanisms are developed. The protection
methods are subject to evaluation by Multi-criteria Analysis Controller (MAC) which
checks their efficiency in eliminating and mitigating attacks without affecting normal
system services and minimizing operational costs. The most appropriate protection
mechanism is then selected by the MAC to protect the network. The chosen protection
method is communicated to the Intrusion Response System (IRS) for initiation to protect
against the detected attack.
The modules of the ASM framework are easy to configure and deploy in an ICS
network, since they are all mounted on a MC-VM (Master Controller Virtual Machine).
The MC-VM operates in stealth mode, and is not visible to internal and external network
users. This mechanism protects the MC-VM from cyber attacks.
Autonomic computing technology is used in our work to forecast a cyber attack
on an ICS network and protect against it with minimum human intervention[32][33]. This
framework employs techniques such as risk assessment, intrusion estimation, intrusion
15

detection, forensic analysis, and intrusion response to protect systems against cyber
threats.
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CHAPTER II
RELATED WORK

As discussed in chapter 1, critical infrastructure industries use ICS to monitor
operations in their network from a remote location. Computer worms such as Stuxnet,
DuQu, etc, can infect PLC and spread rapidly in ICS network using LAN
communications. This led to an increased awareness towards cyber security in critical
infrastructure sectors. Consequently, measures are being undertaken to develop security
solutions to protect the ICS network from cyber attacks.
In this chapter, we examine the threat faced by critical infrastructure due to
vulnerable devices deployed in the ICS network. Vulnerabilities are exploited to carry out
attacks that affect security components in a system. We review necessary protection
methods and security policies that are being developed to prevent illegitimate access to
networks. We also review attacks on critical infrastructure and security methods to
mitigate their impacts.
2.1

Vulnerabilities in Devices in ICS network
Intruders exploit vulnerabilities in ICS devices to disrupt normal system

operations affecting the availability of resources to the society in general. This has
motivated the development of stringent security measures to protect devices in the ICS
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network. The level of protection required to secure an ICS varies in different sectors
depending upon the extent of damage expected from an attack on that sector.
Brian Meixell and Erick Forner[34] studied ICS networks in critical infrastructure
industries and reported over 93,000 devices in various control networks which were using
the Modbus protocol. The identified devices were servers and other control network
devices such as workstations and RTUs. It is commonly found that, due to a higher threat
perception, necessary attention is given to secure servers while field devices such as RTU
and PLC remain ignored[35]. These devices, though not directly accessible via Internet,
need protection because malware can spread to them from infected servers affecting
functions of the control network.
The security of field devices often gets ignored because even if a device is
attacked affecting its functions, other field devices continue to update the server. With the
server getting regularly updated, normal system operations remain unaffected [36][37].
However, malicious software can self-replicate and spread to other devices from the
infected device. Hence, securing servers without securing other devices in the network
can still cause an attack.
As the operational efficiency of field devices is improving, their complexity is
increasing resulting in increased vulnerabilities. Hence, securing field devices is difficult
because recent control software is complex and requires high processing capabilities.
With newer functions being developed and integrated into ICS, its network
complexity is continuously increasing. For example, introducing a database server in the
network to store data of the collected process parameters adds to its complexity and
vulnerability. Hence, to fully secure a network we need to protect each of its components
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from web as well as network based attacks. This emphasizes the need to adhere to
information security policies to protect database servers to avoid attacks pilfering stored
data [38].
These vulnerabilities are a threat to critical infrastructure. Several steps have been
taken towards addressing these vulnerabilities which includes access control policies,
firewall, intrusion detection system, vulnerability assessment, risk assessment, threat
assessment and penetration tests.
2.2

Threat to Critical Infrastructure
Threat is the likelihood of an attack to damage or disrupt operations in a network.

Since an ICS executes critical network operations, it is complex and encompasses several
functionalities making its threat landscape large. Multiple attack vectors are utilized by
intruders to exploit industrially and socially significant operations controlled by ICS
networks. An attack vector is defined as an entry point into a system or a network
through which an intruder can launch attacks and gain access to the system. Hence, each
entry point of a system needs to be adequately protected.
Due to the potential impact of disruption of critical infrastructure services on the
society, terrorist organizations have been found to acquire experience and expertise in
fields of cyberspace protection and computer engineering[39]. Interest of terrorist groups
in ICS was clear when documentary evidence of ICS equipment was found in terrorist
camps of Afghanistan. Programmed threats to intrude and disrupt normal functions of an
ICS were also seized from these locations [40]. Due to these reasons, the White House
network security consultant, Richard Clarke addressed cyber terrorism as a serious threat
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to critical infrastructure and emphasized the need to strictly implement security policies
in the ICS network[41].
A potential attack in the nuclear energy sector can adversely impact scores of
human lives because of exposure to nuclear radiation. This makes it a prime target for
cyber terrorists. In an effort to secure operations of nuclear facilities and control nuclear
energy, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) was established as an autonomous
bureau by the U.S. Congress in 1974. The oil and gas sector is also a potential target for
cyber attacks because it produces hazardous materials and affects a large population.
Hence, the United States is continuingly taking measures to improve cyber security and
completely secure critical infrastructure sectors.
2.3

Attacks on Critical Infrastructure
CERT, which has been researching security issues in industrial control systems,

reported only 6 cyber attacks in a study conducted in 1988 (when Internet was not widely
adopted) [3]. With the use of Internet in ICS applications, the number and scope of
attacks dramatically increased. This is reflected from CERT identifying 137,529 cyber
intrusions in critical infrastructure for the period 1988 - 2003. In this section, we discuss
frequent attacks on critical infrastructure and their effects on the fundamental aspects of
security.
Intruders target attack vectors to launch cyber attacks which affect system
security. Integrity, availability and confidentiality of information are fundamental aspects
of security in a system. Depending on the intensity of the attack, one or all of the
fundamental aspects can be affected. In an ICS network, integrity, availability and
confidentiality are required at all times[42]. This is exemplified by considering a gas
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pipeline control system with gas pressure maintained at a setpoint value of 10 Pounds per
Square Inch (PSI). If actuators in this control system configuration are attacked, incorrect
process parameters are communicated to the server. In this case, assume that the attacker
updates the server with current gas pressure value of 5 PSI. This would result in an
increase of pressure to 15 PSI instead of maintaining it at the setpoint value of 10 PSI
impacting the system adversely. This justifies how maintaining availability without
protecting integrity is ineffective.
2.3.1

Denial of Service Attack
DoS attacks affect the availability aspect of the system security. In[43], authors

demonstrated a DoS attack by sending attack packets to Modbus TCP slaves in the
control network. They injected packets into the network with function code 43 (Read
Device Identification) to identify slaves in the same subnet as the master. Slaves
supporting function code 43 responded to the request with their operating system details.
After identification of slave devices, packets with incorrect process parameters were sent
to the slave causing congestion in the network. A slave can only respond to a certain
number of requests and gets overwhelmed by the multitude of packets injected into the
network. This leads to exhaustion of available resources for requests sent by the master
adversely affecting the availability of the system.
A DoS attack disrupts communications in both the control and corporate
networks. Disruption of communication in the control network can potentially affect
supply of essential services. Similarly, if the corporate network is affected and taken
offline, business establishments can lose thousands of dollars every hour.
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2.3.2

Man-in-the-middle Attack
MiTM attacks affect the confidentiality aspect of the system security. A MiTM

attack is executed by intercepting a communication session between two devices while
remaining undiscovered. Here, the attacker gains access to the information exchanged
between two devices by replacing the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) key of the victim by the
public key of the attacker. Data exchanged between the two communicating devices is
thereby duplicated by the attacker and sent to the receiving device in disguise of the
sending machine. Thus, the attacker gains access to confidential information
communicated between the respective devices [44].
2.4

Protection Methods to Mitigate Cyber Attacks
Considering the threat landscape of ICS and its vulnerabilities, protection

methods are deployed in a network depending upon the criticality of vulnerabilities found
and the extent of damage that can be caused in case of an attack. In the past, physical
threats constituted the major bulk of damage to the control network. Hence, to secure
critical assets, industries have formulated control policies allowing only authorized
personnel to access the network. Presently, corporate and control networks are being
connected to support remote network monitoring. A security breach in the corporate
network can also affect the control network. Due to this increased connectivity and
complexity between the networks, ICS is under constant risk of attack. The objective of
modern day protection methods is to shield the network from all forms of illegitimate
access, including physical and cyber threats by developing a potent defense-in-depth
strategy[45].
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An independent security analyst, Rubén Santamarta, identified 14 hard-coded
passwords in Network Options Ethernet (NOE) 100 and NOE 771 modules employed in
industrial automation. Some of these passwords were found published in support
handbooks. Intruders can exploit this flaw by remotely logging into network devices to
gain privileged access to their operations[46]. Incidents like the attack on the water
facility in Illinois proved that attacks on critical infrastructure can be accomplished
remotely by accessing sensitive network information[47]. In this section, we discuss a
few detection and protection techniques deployed in ICS to secure it against cyber
attacks; however, it should be noted that system related concerns should be addressed
before deploying security solutions evolving from any of these methods because the set
of solutions may need alteration depending on the changes made in the system
configuration.
2.4.1

Vulnerability Assessment
Authors in[48] outline the need to perform vulnerability assessment on a system

to protect it from cyber attacks. Authors in [49] further suggest the need to analyze every
aspect of the network design for vulnerabilities before initializing the system. Devices
executing major network and system operations should be analyzed for vulnerabilities
with priority. Based on the vulnerabilities detected, the extent of possible loss is studied.
Depending on the criticality of potential loss, protection methods are developed and
implemented to restore normal system operation in case of an attack.
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2.4.2

Perimeter Security
Control networks are protected by utilizing the concept of perimeter security.

Perimeter security is a well-defined boundary between the control and corporate
networks. Firewall is a security system that is used to monitor traffic at the outer
boundary of the network. Hardware and software firewalls in the control network are
configured to monitor inbound/outbound traffic to detect illegitimate traffic[50]. On
detection, illegitimate traffic is blocked using Access Control List (ACL) policies and
firewall rules. However, blocking illegitimate traffic from the network is inadequate in
protecting it from the threat of external attacks [51][52].
2.4.3

System Hardening
System hardening is a process of disabling application and service ports not

needed on a device. In a control network, field devices are often capable of processing
applications that are not necessary for their prime operation. For example, in field
devices, the capability of processing word documents and multi-media files is unused
because they mostly monitor control processes. Therefore, such services should be
disabled on the device to reduce the threat landscape.
2.4.4

Platform Partitioning
The platform partitioning technique separates each system application into a

function that operates independently and communicates with the Virtual Machine
Monitor (VMM) for exchanging data with other applications. VMM divides the available
system resources such as processor and memory into servers, applications, and other
processes running on a device. If one of these applications gets compromised, other
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applications running on the device still remain unaffected because the partitioning makes
them invisible to each other. In the control network, devices connected to Internet can be
platform partitioned so that if they are attacked we can prevent the attack from spreading
to other devices in the network.
2.4.5

Intrusion Detection System
Having secured the perimeter using firewall, it is still necessary to analyze

incoming network traffic to look for inconsistency and detect any attack. This is done by
intrusion detection system (IDS). In[53], authors identified that because the number of
servers and the amount of data transfer in an ICS network is mostly constant, detection
techniques are easily employed in critical infrastructure compared to traditional IT
networks. By identifying the type of attack, the intrusion detection system also facilitates
appropriate response by IRS.
2.4.5.1

Anomaly-based IDS
Anomaly-based IDS detects anomalies in the magnitude of traffic on the network,

anomaly in the type of information requested by the masters, amount of requests received
by the slave and other anomalies. Researchers have developed different types of IDS
using a variety of techniques to detect potential anomalies in network traffic and
incoming packet contents. Here, we present two different implementations of anomalybased IDS.
Yang et al.[54] developed an anomaly-based IDS by monitoring system variables,
using Auto-Associative Kernel Regression (AAKR) and statistical probability ratio test.
Their IDS could accurately detect four variants amongst tens of possible methods of a
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DoS attack. In their control system configuration, sixty two process variables were
present. Upon careful impact analysis of the above four variants on the control system,
the IDS was programmed to monitor those five process variables that were most
adversely affected. The authors reported that it was important to choose the variables that
were most affected because monitoring any insignificantly affected variable misdirects
the IDS in its classification process. Inaccurate classification of the attack will lead to
false alarms making it inefficient for detecting real time attacks.
Apart from the detection of known attacks as studied by Yang et al.[55], it is
important for IDS to identify unknown intrusions. Dussel et al.[56] implemented a
payload-based anomaly IDS to detect both known and zero-day SCADA-specific attacks.
They analyzed byte strings in the payload of inbound traffic to detect attacks. To develop
their IDS, the authors collected attack packet data and segregated it into two types of
datasets based on the protocols used. The first dataset consisted of approximately one
million HTTP packet observations which were categorized into 42 different types of
attacks and exploited 11 system vulnerabilities. The second dataset had 822,000 TCP
packet observations and were categorized into 19 different attacks exploiting 8 system
vulnerabilities. These datasets were used to train Weka classifiers [57][58]. It was
observed that the payload-based IDS was 88%-92% accurate in detecting both known and
unknown attacks.
2.4.5.2

Signature-based IDS
Signature-based IDS are used to identify and classify known threat prototypes;

hence, by using rules that already exist in the database [59]. These rules consist of a
mapping between the known attack packet signatures in the database and incoming
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packets into the network. This IDS is limited to the identification of known attacks,
limiting its scope of operation.
2.4.5.3

Robustness of IDS
The analysis of collected data samples is central to the functioning of an intrusion

detection system. The robustness of IDS hence largely depends on factors such as the
collected packet attributes and the classification of their corresponding real-time data.
Despite collecting data according to the above norms, several studies[60] have found that
if a burst of attack packets are encountered by the IDS, it is possible that it will not be
able to classify a bulk of the real-time traffic. Generally, IDS with the above discussed
features and their limitation is sufficient to deal with most cases of real-time attack. In
cases where classification of all the incoming traffic is required, IDS is not sufficient[61]
[62].
2.4.6

Intrusion Protection System
Similar to IDS, an intrusion protection system (IPS) also monitors network traffic,

but also has the capability to take immediate action in case of a known attack. It can
accept, drop, reject, deny, block or pass traffic depending on a set of rules written by the
network administrator. An example of this functionality is the blocking of an attacker’s
IP address to prevent further request of information from the slave.
The security methods we studied till this section will be rendered ineffective if the
attacker uses covert command and control channels to send attack packets to the slave.
While exploiting the system through these channels, an attack packet is sent over those
ports whose traffic is usually allowed to pass through the firewall. Thus, these packets
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remain invisible to the firewall. These can also remain undetected by the IDS as
malicious data is often concealed in various TCP control fields of the packet. Such cases
can only be detected by an IPS due to its ability to check incoming packets for the
inclusion of hidden additional data [63][64][65].
Snort[66] is an open source IPS that can analyze packets to detect attacks such as
buffer overflow, OS fingerprinting, Common Gateway Interface (CGI) scans and others.
Snort can be operated as a packet sniffer or a packet logger. It operates based on a set of
rules that determine its action (accept, drop etc) in response to an incoming packet. For
example, a rule may state that packets whose payload contains ‘ffab cdfa’, should be
flagged.
Snort rules for common attacks can already be found in National Institute for
Standards and Technology (NIST), Digital Bond and CERT databases. These rules span
(but are not limited to) attacks such as planting a worm on a device in the network,
deleting files on a SCADA server, changing log data in the database server, and logging
key strokes to gain access to passwords.
Snort can also be used for protecting a system from various other vulnerabilities.
Here we elaborate on its usage to avoid the exploitation of a newly detected vulnerability
until a security patch is developed for it. This is achieved by writing a set of Snort rules
to specifically target the given vulnerability. A Snort rule can be kept generic in order to
target a broad category of packets, resulting in detection of several variants of an attack
which exploit that particular vulnerability. However, this may lead to a few false alarms.
Hence, under common practice, some Snort rules are made more specific. This is done by
adding additional rule options to check through more attributes of a data packet such as
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payload data content, protocol type and port number. The specificity of the rule leads to a
lower number of false alarms, but is only able to target a fewer variants of the attack. To
prevent a vulnerability from being exploited, several Snort rules are written targeting
different aspects of the vulnerability. This prevents the vulnerable components from
being used as entry points into the system[66].
Some of the recent usage of Snort in system protection can be found in the work
of Yang et al.[67][68] who developed snort rules to identify attack packets that targeted
devices operating on the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC 60870-5-104)
protocol. In the reported work, depending on the criticality of an attack, the Snort rules
either blocked the IP address of the sender or dropped the particular packet that triggered
the rule. Another example is the work by Oman and Phillips[69] who developed snort
rules to decode and normalize telnet port traffic.
2.5

Security Considerations in Industrial Protocols
Security concerns in an ICS network are addressed by methods discussed in

section 2.4. Another aspect of the network which can lead to enhanced security is
improvement in its communication protocol. A common way to improve protocol
security is by using key exchange methods. The key exchange provides an additional
layer of authentication and establishes integrity in the communication. The key exchange
method involves generation of a secret key by the server for each communication session
with a client. The key is encrypted and even if an attacker gets the key, it cannot be
decrypted as the encryption algorithm used by the server is kept secret. After exchanging
the secret key between the server and client, the actual data encryption and
communication begins. The encryption algorithm could be MD5 (Message Digest) or
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SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm) or the server could first encrypt the key with MD5 and
then encrypt it again with SHA or use a different algorithm all together[70][71]. In this
section, we discuss security in the context of Modbus protocol since it is the de facto
standard in ICS networks and is used in our virtual testbed for communication.
2.5.1

Modbus Protocol and its Inherent Security Flaws
The Modbus protocol was initially developed to operate over the serial line[72].

Serial communications were later found to be susceptible to electromagnetic interference
and physical destruction of the cable. Further, to facilitate remote monitoring, devices
capable of accessing Internet were being integrated into the network. These devices could
not communicate with the Modbus slave(s) in the network because they used the TCP/IP
protocol for communication. Due to these reasons, the Modbus protocol was extended to
use TCP/IP. As a result of this development, several attack vectors that did not exist in
Modbus RTU (based on serial communication) emerged in the extended protocol known
as Modbus TCP/IP. It hence has several vulnerabilities, a few of which are outlined
below.
Modbus protocol lacks a provision to verify the identity of the master requesting
information from the slave. Due to this lack of authentication, there is no means for the
slave to check if the master is legitimate or not. Hence, an attacker can easily cause a
MiTM attack by duplicating packets between communicating devices.
Modbus TCP/IP can only transmit packet data in plain text. The lack of
encryption allows the command packets to be interpreted by anyone. If an attacker gains
access to such a network, the packet data can be easily analyzed (using sniffers like
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Wireshark) thus exposing details about register contents, addresses of legitimate masters
in the network as well as supported function codes on the slave.
Lack of integrity is also a concern in Modbus because the checksum segment of
the packet can be easily tampered. Checksum is a small piece of datum that is used to
determine if the packet contents were altered between the source and destination.
Altering checksum is easy because Modbus protocol computes checksum on the transport
level instead of the application level. Hence, the checksum of a command packet sent by
a legitimate master can be easily altered, to which the slave does not respond due to
incorrect checksum.
2.5.2

Key Exchange Method in Modbus Protocol
As an example of key exchange in the Modbus protocol, we elaborate the study

undertaken by the authors in [73]. In this, both slave and master use a pseudo random
number generator to compute their private key. The generated random number is kept
large so as to elongate the time needed to decrypt the key in the event of an attacker
gaining access to the key. This key exchange is done via a unicast connection to further
obviate any possibility of the key being leaked. Thus, there is less chance for an attacker
to eavesdrop on the communication. The study used an algorithm from amongst SHA256, Symmetric Key Key Establishment (SKKE) and SEED to compute the exchange
key. That same algorithm is also used to encrypt the associated data packet. Since a three
way handshake is required between the two communicating devices before they can
actually start sending and receiving data, both the devices are able to verify each other’s
identities[74][75].
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2.6

Penetration Testing
In sections 2.4 and 2.5 various methods were discussed that facilitate an improved

system protection. The robustness of these methods is gauged using penetration testing. A
penetration test involves attacking the IT infrastructure under test to evaluate its security
weaknesses. This method of voluntarily authorizing an attack to simulate the possible
outcomes in the event of a real attack brings any unknown vulnerabilities to the fore. In
general, the penetration testing is used throughout the process of building the system
security, to continually find new vulnerabilities, not just as the final check. An example
of penetration testing is discussed elaborately in the work of [76] where it is applied it in
the context of security solutions for a power grid.
2.7

Autonomic Computing
Autonomic computing was proposed based on the conceptual functioning of the

autonomic nervous system. As the nervous system automatically maintains body
functions like heart rate, body temperature, digestion etc; autonomic systems were
developed to automatically monitor, manage and administer networks. The concept of
autonomic computing has lately started being used in protection mechanisms of ICS.
2.7.1

Autonomic Distributed Computing Systems
Originally, the idea of autonomic computing started being used in the context of

distributed computing systems. Distributed computing systems execute a given task by
splitting the load among available system resources in the network. The tasks are
assigned to different devices by administering system attributes such as basic auditing,
resource allotment and access control policies to optimize the execution. But the interplay
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of decision making on resource availability, resource allocation and task distribution
makes the distributed computing system overly complex and inefficient. Autonomic
distributed systems were introduced to overcome this shortcoming. An autonomic system
is aware of the network topology at all times. The information about any new device that
is added to the network or taken offline is always up to date in the case of an autonomic
computing system. This enables the autonomic system to make routing decisions in a
dynamic environment, thus achieving high resource utilization and cost-efficiency
[77][78][79].
2.7.2

Development of Autonomic Solutions for ICS
Protection methods developed to secure critical infrastructure were providing a

limited level of resilience and protection against attacks. This gave a motivation for
inception of the strengths of autonomic computing (elaborated in previous sections) in
protection mechanism in ICS.
To overcome these limitations, current research in the area of autonomic
computing is geared towards the development of an autonomic computing cycle aiding
across the process of monitoring, analysis, planning, and execution of tasks. The
autonomic system monitors control processes in the network to detect anomalies. The
analysis of detected anomalies helps determine the state of system security. This state
triggers the execution of protection methods as may be necessary. This coherent
functioning of all system components necessitates that all devices be updated with the
current access control policies and network configuration [80][81].
Taking a further leap in this direction, the scope of autonomic security solutions
for ICS is being expanded by applying the concept of Artificial Intelligence (AI) to
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implement the autonomic self-managing characteristic. AI can be understood by the
example of Finite State Machines (FSM) where the implementation of AI enables the
dynamic determination of the next state and behavior based on goals, policies and utility
functions of the system. On similar lines, recent research efforts intend to develop a selfmanaging autonomic system to monitor system attributes and dynamically change its
state when a transition condition is satisfied. Thus using AI, the autonomic system will be
able to choose an appropriate set of actions based on the concerned policies and goals
needed to achieve desirable system states. For example, if being secured is the desirable
system state, an autonomic system using the AI approach, will iteratively take all
necessary steps (e.g launching a protection method) to keep the system in its desirable
state[82].
The implementation of self-managing characteristic using the AI approach comes
with the added complication that if the transition system conditions are not thorough and
comprehensible, the next state of the system will be incorrect. If the system is unable to
determine its next state correctly, its actions and behavior will not be in accordance to its
current security state [83]. Also, factors such as performance standards, traffic load and
security objectives of the network should be considered while designing and validating
autonomic security solutions [84].
2.7.3

Application of Autonomic Computing Solutions
The application of autonomic computing solutions in protection mechanisms of an

ICS network is a new concept and an area of active research. Here we discuss a study
undertaken by researchers from University of Arizona using self-protection in autonomic
computing to secure ICS from attacks namely DoS, buffer overflow and TCP reset.
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Their framework consisted of anomaly-based IDS to detect attacks and an
intrusion response module for protection. The response module is introduced to
implement the self-protection characteristic of autonomic computing. On detection of an
attack, the response module initiates counter measures depending on pre-determined
policies to maintain normal operational levels. In their study, counter measures that affect
normal system operations are programmed to get approval from the operator; whereas,
counter measures that do not affect normal system operations can be executed directly by
the response module. Their main goal was to reduce human intervention to improve the
response time of the system against attacks [85][86][87].
In the aforementioned work, traffic is flagged as anomalous if it does not obey a
set of rules. Unlike their approach, in this document we report a model-based autonomic
security management framework which identifies a suspicious attack based on an attack
model. This attack model guides the functionality of IDS, IEM, IPS and IRS (elaborated
in Section 3.3). Our work can be contrasted with the work reported by University of
Arizona by noting that they used a rule learning algorithm (RIPPER) to build their
baseline model while we classified our real-time observations using machine learning
algorithms (Weka) and data mining methods.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY

SCADA, DCS, and other smaller control system configurations are used to handle
network operations in the critical infrastructure sector. These control systems are
integrated and utilized to manage dispersed assets using centralized data acquisition and
supervisory control to monitor and administer networks. ICS has constantly been under
cyber threat and protection methods to secure assets are continually being developed and
deployed in the existing ICS networks. This need is addressed by the autonomic security
management framework we have developed and reported in this thesis.
The model-based autonomic security management framework monitors SCADA
systems activities in real-time. Sensors monitor and collect security related behavioral
data, and send it to the data processing module. The data processing module extracts
relevant security attributes from the raw input data, and sends it to the IEM for
evaluation. The IEM analyzes input data and predicts the probability of attacks in the
near future. If an attack is predicted, a forewarning message is instantly communicated to
MAC for initiating the appropriate action. MAC evaluates responses based on the type of
attack predicted and selects the method with the highest outranking flow value.
The intrusion response module initiates the protection method chosen by MAC
and attempts to protect the system from the predicted attack. If an attacker penetrates the
first line of defense (spanning intrusion estimation and protection), IDS still detects the
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intrusion in real-time. On detection of an attack by IDS, the current security state of the
system is communicated to MAC. As described earlier, MAC sends commands to the
IRS to initiate an appropriate protection method to defend against the intrusion. In case of
an unknown attack, the output of forensic analysis is fed into the learning module. The
learning module updates attack signatures in detection algorithms and raw data continues
to be processed in the same way as that of a known attack. The ASM framework
configured with these modules is built into the SCADA network.
3.1

ICS Virtual Testbed
An ICS virtual testbed [88] was used in the research reported in this document.

The testbed comprised of a set of typical networking equipment in an ICS environment.
The major components of the testbed design consist of a process simulator, a virtual
device, configuration files, and data loggers. These elements were used to evaluate and
record network traffic.
The process simulator models physical processes running on the virtual device
[88]. The virtual device functions as a design configuration for MTU and RTU. Their
control logic is built in Python to imitate internal MTU and RTU programs (similar to
ladder logic). It incorporates the intrinsic memory of MTU and RTU equipment. Virtual
devices interact with the process simulator through a personal simulator communication
channel. Configuration files contain the necessary information required for the
connection between various components of the testbed’s equipment. It also sets the
contact procedure between every interface. This virtual testbed design was used primarily
because it closely emulates the MSU physical SCADA lab system.
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3.2

Self-Protecting SCADA Systems
The goal of the autonomic security management framework is to achieve self-

protection in SCADA systems. The ASM framework employs the concept of feedback
control theory [89] to evaluate threats and control regular functions of SCADA systems.
The self-protecting SCADA system precisely and promptly predicts forthcoming
abnormalities, transmits prior alerts to the MAC, and secures the system by initiating
appropriate protection methods.
Highly advanced threats which pass through the initial security system on account
of either unknown attacks or inaccurate assessment of projected security state, are filtered
in the second stage of the IDS. To provide support against unknown attacks, live forensic
analysis and penetration testing are performed to gain specific information regarding the
possible impacts of an unknown attack. Detection algorithms and active response
libraries are instantaneously updated with its newly discovered attack signatures ensuring
future attacks are anticipated and mitigated through the first line of defense.
3.3

The ASM Framework
The self-protecting ASM structure consists of four major features: risk

assessment, intrusion estimation, intrusion detection, and intrusion response. As shown in
Figure 3, these features are implemented by modules mounted on a Frosnt VM (Virtual
Machine). The setup of the standard operational area (i.e., profile) of the SCADA system
is built offline, taking into account expert knowledge, experimental results, literature
review, and security guidelines. The function of each of these modules is discussed in
sections 3.3.1 - 3.3.6.
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Figure 3.1

The ASM Framework deployed in an ICS Network

The ASM framework comprises of monitors, an IDS, and an IRS. The ASM
framework alternates between fully-autonomous and semi-autonomous functionality.
Other modules in the ASM framework are forensic analysis module (FAM), intrusion
estimation module (IEM) and a multi-criteria analysis controller (MAC). The function of
IEM module is to predict forthcoming attacks by analyzing historical data and mitigating
known attacks instantaneously before the system is compromised. FAM evaluates effects
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of unknown attacks from novel attack signatures and revises detection algorithms and the
current response library to prevent similar types of potential attacks. MAC is utilized for
assessing and choosing suitable actions to protect against cyber-attacks.
As shown in Figure 3, in an ICS network, the central server connects to the
historian server through a firewall to gather current process states of devices operating in
the network. The control network and the corporate network are separated by a firewall,
which employs a specific set of access control policies for traffic regulation. This
“demilitarized zone” is often not sufficient to block illegitimate users from accessing the
network [90]. Therefore, risk assessment analysis is executed to detect system
weaknesses and apply basic security measures to minimize the risk of an attack. Intrusion
estimation is also implemented to support the identification and prevention of cyberattacks without affecting normal system functions. In case of an attack, IRS initiates the
best protection method evaluated by the MAC. Experimental results demonstrated in
Chapter 4 prove that the ASM framework successfully detects and protects the system
against cyber intrusions. Hence, the ASM framework automates and enhances network
communications without disruption of services maintained by the control system.
3.3.1

The Risk Assessment Module
Evaluation of a control system’s vulnerabilities and analyzing consequences of a

possible security breach are the initial steps in the development of a security system for
ICS networks. Functions implemented in the control system are analyzed rigorously for
vulnerabilities and weaknesses. After this assessment, the normal region of operation gets
outlined. For example, in a gas pipeline control system, values of gas pressure, setpoint
and PID gain gets determined.
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The output of risk assessment specifies the recognized threats and the level of
vulnerability found in the system. Depending upon risk assessment values obtained from
initial analysis, system administrators initiate standard security controls to protect the
system. A few standard security controls are firewall protection, anti-virus software,
access control lists and security policies. The type of attack encountered by the system is
determined from the information about vulnerabilities identified during risk assessment.
Based on the type of attack, the control system operation being targeted by the attacker is
determined. Depending on this information, suitable actions to better protect the system
are initiated.
The risk assessment module is configured to function offline and not
“autonomously” [91] due to the constraints involved in identifying the “normal region” of
steady state operations. In our case, the “normal” state of the system is the standard for
determining the correct system security state.
3.3.2

The Monitoring Module
This module monitors important system specific parameters. These are parameters

with considerable impact on the SCADA system network and security resources (e.g.,
Modbus TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol) packet header,
Protocol Data Unit (PDU), CPU utilization, and memory utilization).
Features directly affecting the functioning of physical infrastructure in a control
system configuration also need to be monitored. For example, in a gas pipeline control
system, open/close state of valves and on/off state of pumps is critical for its operation
because their activity greatly impacts normal operations of the system.
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The monitoring module monitors eight system and network attributes: CPU idle
time, number of bytes written/sec, amount of memory used as buffers, amount of memory
cached, amount of active and inactive memory, and number of packets received and
transmitted/sec. These attributes were chosen based on the vulnerabilities identified by
the risk assessment module. The attribute that gauges the number of bytes written per sec
was monitored because the injection attack packets were programmed to write false data
values to registers in the virtual testbed. In a physical system, an injection attack alters
values in the PLC memory transmitting false process data to the server.
Memory utilization attributes such as the amount of memory used by buffers was
selected to identify the amount of RAM (Random Access Memory) that can be utilized in
disk caching. The amount of memory swapped was not monitored because any memory
transfer from the disk cache to the buffers was allowed only when applications needed
more memory for processing. This was achieved by altering the default setting of
swappiness from 60 to 0. Hence, in such a setting, no memory is swapped unless
absolutely necessary. This setting also accounts for the direct relation between the
amount of memory cached and the amount of memory used as buffers. For instance, if
more memory is needed by an application, an increase in both disk caching and amount
of memory buffered is noticed. This direct proportionality can be problematic while
handling randomness in a dataset discussed in section 3.3.3 and 3.3.5.
The amount of data cached was chosen to be monitored as it is an estimate of the
amount of memory being used by processes executing on the device at a given time. The
amount of active and inactive memory and the number of packets transmitted and
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received by the server are simultaneously monitored to identify a deviation in usual
network communications to detect an attack [92].
The monitoring module can be configured as an operating system snap-in (e.g.,
Windows Performance Monitor and Linux System Activity Monitor) collecting values of
security related attributes in real-time.
This research is an extension of Qian Chen’s work [93] on enterprise control
systems. The security system design developed by Qian Chen monitors features such as,
CPU memory utilization, CPU system utilization, available memory, packets received
and sent by the server, I/O read requests/sec and I/O write requests/sec.
The focus of this thesis is, risk evaluation, detection of intrusions, forensics
analysis and security attribute selection in the context of industrial control systems. It is
critical to select relevant security features to accurately evaluate attack impacts and detect
abnormalities. Appropriate feature selection reduces the time needed for raw data
analysis and data processing.
3.3.3

The Data Processing Module
Real-time observations gathered by the monitoring module are analyzed by the

data processing module. The recorded data is processed and arranged as datasets fed to
the IEM for the prediction of potential threats. In some cases like heavy network traffic,
sensors may not be able to examine real-time observations of all attributes. This results in
an incomplete dataset. Missing values in the dataset are handled by adding a default value
to the observation based on the missing parameter. In parallel, the processed dataset is
also sent to the IDS, which utilizes these complete datasets to detect attacks in real-time.
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In our approach, the data processing module acts as a data mining tool extracting
specific process parameters from a large amount of real-time data received from the
monitoring module. Real-time data of several different types of attacks were collected to
achieve randomness in the processed dataset. This is required to avoid direct correlations
between attributes and results. A correlation can lead to incorrect attack detection by the
IDS.
3.3.4

Intrusion Estimation
Real-time data is forwarded from the data processing module to the IEM for

prediction of the forthcoming security situation. Statistical methods (e.g., time series
forecasting methods such as Kalman Filter or the Autoregressive Integrated Moving
Average (ARIMA) method) are combined with system models and historical datasets to
forecast attribute standards. Comparing the “normal region” data with the anticipated
output of the system model enables the IEM to forecast probable threats. If an attack is
predicted, forewarnings are sent to the controller to initiate suitable responses to protect
against the predicted threat.
IEM utilizes historical datasets of control variables   k  1, n   to predict the next
state of the system. Security attributes chosen for monitoring    k  1, n   are also used
for prediction. Equation 3.1 and 3.2 represent the forecasting model predicting the future
security state of the system.

ˆ (k )  K (w(k  1, n))
w

(3.1)

ˆ(k )  K ( (k  1, n))

(3.2)
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where wˆ (k ) indicates anticipated value of control variables (e.g., the water level in
a storage tank and the gas pressure of a gas pipeline control system) and ˆ (k ) indicates
the selected security attributes of the SCADA system (e.g., TCP/IP packet rates and TCP
connection rates). w(k  1, n) and  (k  1, n) are sets of experimental control variables. The
chosen SCADA system security features are

w(k  1, n)  {w(k  1),w(k  2),....., w(k  n  1)} and

 (k  1, n)  { (k  1), (k  2),......, (k  n  1)} .
To estimate the future security state of SCADA systems, its dependence on the
present system security state, anticipated values of control variables, and evaluation of
selected security features should be considered. Equation 3.3 represents the system model
used for predicting the gas pressure and water level in our control system configurations.

xˆ(k  1)  f ( x(k ), wˆ (k ), ˆ(k ), u(k ))
where

x( k )

(3.3)

is the security state of the SCADA system at time k. The anticipated value

of the security state of a SCADA system, xˆ(k  1) is compared with the values of the
normal operational region of the system determined offline. The projected security state
of a system is considered anomalous, if the anticipated security state deviates from the
identified normal region. Based on the projected security state of the system, MAC
evaluates responses to protect the system from anticipated threats. The ideal response,

(u ) with the highest outranking score is communicated to the IRS for initiation.
The IEM, also called the forecaster, is developed to predict the value of important
process parameters determined by the risk assessment module in a control system
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configuration. The features are chosen based on the extent of damage caused if the
element of the system depending on the exploited feature is affected under attack. In our
case, the gas pipeline pressure and the level of water in the storage tank control system
are predicted. We also predict the number of attacks identified by the Snort IDS. Based
on its rules file, Snort maintains a log of the dropped packets. The log file is commonly
referred to as the alert file. The forecaster operates on the generated alert file to predict
the next security state of the system.
In [32], we predicted parameters related to Performance-based Intrusion Detection
Systems (PIDS). A PIDS inspects parameters directly affecting system performance. For
example, in her work, memory utilization, number of packets received by the server and
the CPU idle time were a few predicted parameters.
3.3.5

The Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
The IDS (section 2.4.5) implemented in our work applies the same concept of

real-time data collection for effective attack detection. The function of this module is to
inspect data for real-time event analysis. This module detects threats by identifying
abnormal system activity. It compares real-time data fed to it by the data processing
module with intrusion signatures to detect cyber threats that escaped the first line of
defense (IEM). The IDS uses performance-based, as well as signature-based detection
techniques to identify and categorize various types of known attacks. Unlike a PIDS, the
Signature-based Intrusion Detection System (SIDS) analyzes packet contents to detect
attacks.
The offline training model of the IDS uses the Weka Rotation Forest classifier.
The accuracy of the trained dataset is 99% [94]. The IDS speedily classifies known
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attacks and improves MACs capacity of selecting the best protection method. However,
low impact cyber threats can still enter the network undetected. To circumvent this issue,
a rule-based signature IDS using Snort is also developed.
The IDS analyzes real-time behavioral data and classifies each observation in five
categories. These categories are Function Code Scanning (FCS) attack, MPCI (Malicious
Parameter Command Injection) attack, MSCI (Malicious State Command Injection)
attack, DoS attack and normal system operation.
On evaluation of real-time data, most of the Weka classifiers demonstrated
acceptable accuracy results with training datasets. Due to this reason, the effectiveness of
the dataset itself was put into question. The examination of the dataset illustrated direct
correlations between several monitored security parameters and the five classification
categories of the IDS. To increase the effectiveness of the dataset, several variations of
MPCI, MSCI, FCS and DoS attacks were developed to exploit vulnerabilities in the
system. Real-time data for each of these attack cases were collected to add randomness to
the dataset.
A few parameters proposed for detection were time to live, destination port
number, source port number, packet retransmission rate, number of page hits per
client/sec, average access time/page, request rate of HTTP packets, payload length,
packet drop rate, and unauthorized file access. These attributes focused on TCP packet
contents. In a future study, this work can be extended to monitor signature-based
attributes. For example, in a gas pipeline control system, signature-based features include
command address, control scheme, gain value, reset, rate, deadband, and cycle time.

47

In the ICS virtual testbed used for this work, the operation of the PID
(Proportional Integral Derivative) controller depends on the gain, reset and deadband
values. In the controller, the value of (P) equals the gain of the system, (I) equals the reset
parameter and (D) equals the rate parameter of the system. SIDS parameters need to be
monitored because an attacker manipulates the functioning of a PID controller by
injecting packets with false information into the network. This greatly affects process
control parameters being monitored.
3.3.6

Live Forensic Analysis
Attacks never experienced by the system are termed as unknown attacks. Their

signatures are not present in the IDS because they are not known to the system. Unknown
attacks are difficult to handle, since the system cannot identify the exact reason for
unfavorable system conditions. Securing SCADA systems from unknown attacks is
difficult because the precise reason for malfunctioning of the system is uncertain. To
solve this problem, we implemented the live forensic analysis module to continuously
collect control system parameters. This functionality is programmed in the IDS module
and should be continuously operational to detect unknown attacks.
The live forensic analysis module uses tools like Wireshark[95] and statistical
techniques (e.g., Naive Bayesian Network) to examine network traffic in real-time.
Footprints of both MC-VM and auditing files are also employed in this analysis. A
footprint is a crucial indicator of the normal system operation and security resource
utilization. Based on live forensic assessments, fresh attack signatures are identified and
included in the IDS by online detection algorithms and defense mechanisms. These
newly identified attack signatures are also inserted into the IEM and the IRS for
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autonomously detecting similar attacks in the future and assisting the MAC in choosing
the best possible response against them.
3.3.7

The Multi-criteria Analysis Controller (MAC)
We developed nine responses to protect the ICS network. They are ‘replacement

of compromised devices’, ‘packet filtering’, ‘serial port disconnection’, ‘dropping
malicious commands’, ‘host shutdown’, ‘one time authentication’, ‘termination of
physical processes’, ‘isolation of compromised devices’, and ‘network disconnection’.
MAC assesses these responses and chooses the best protection method. It then sends
suitable commands to the IRS to initiate the best response to restore normal system
processes.
3.3.7.1

Evaluation Criteria
MAC assesses responses and chooses the best protection method for an attack

based on different criteria. The Preference Ranking Organization Method for Enrichment
Evaluations II (PROMETHEE II) was chosen to analyze protection methods for initiation
in case of an attack. It uses the following four criteria to evaluate responses.
3.3.7.1.1

Criterion 1 - Enhancement of Security

Privacy, reliability and accessibility are the three essential aspects considered
during security enhancements. The response that effectively improves the security of
SCADA systems is denoted with a fuzzy number [96] 0, while the worst response is
denoted with a fuzzy number 1. Other responses are given a value ranging between [0,1].
These fuzzy numbers are normalized response values identifying abnormal system
activities.
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3.3.7.1.2

Criterion 2 - Operational Costs

The execution of SCADA security systems may exhaust computer resources. For
instance, the response “drop malicious commands” greatly affects the CPU utilization
and memory resources of the processor. This is due to the continuous assessment of
Protocol Data Units (PDU) and the simultaneous registering of detected attack signatures.
The execution of responses increases the operational cost/expenditure. The value of the
operational cost for the execution of a response is denoted in the range [0,1]. The
response with the lowest operational cost is allotted 0 while the response with the highest
cost is allotted 1. This normalization process is primarily executed offline.
3.3.7.1.3

Criterion 3 - Maintenance of Normal Operations

Countermeasures employed to protect the system against attacks should not
interfere with normal system activities. The response not affecting normal system
operations is denoted by zero. The worst response causing interference in normal system
activities is given a value of 1. For example, the worst response has an adverse impact on
the CPU and memory utilization. Remaining responses are expressed in the range [0,1].
3.3.7.1.4

Criterion 4 - Impacts on Property and Human Lives

An ICS network getting compromised can adversely impact the environment and
human lives as several of these systems control critical assets and infrastructure are not
adequately equipped to mitigate cyber attacks. Execution of certain responses disrupts
normal operations in a network. Based on their impacts, protection methods are classified
as “automatic” or “semi-automatic”. A disruption in normal system operations is often
observed during the processing of attack models and initiation of the best possible
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response. Responses not causing unfavorable impacts are automated and other responses
are semi-automatic. For instance, responses “terminate physical processes” and “isolation
of compromised devices” can adversely impact the control system configuration and are
hence semi-automatic. Therefore, such responses to mitigate cyber attacks cannot be
automated. Examples of responses with lower impact factor values are “packet filtering,”
“serial port disconnection,” and “adding one time authentication mechanisms”.
Similar to other criteria, the value of responses for this criterion also ranges
between [0,1]. The responses with a value of greater than 0.5 are termed as “automatic”
and do not need special privileges for execution. “Semi-Auto” responses have a value of
less than 0.5 and require human interference needing the approval of an operator before
initiation.
The nine developed responses are configured and installed offline. To mitigate
known attacks, MAC assesses these responses giving equal significance to each of them.
Three of the described criteria are used to determine the appropriate response, while the
fourth is used to choose between human interference and automation. Each criterion gets
an equal weight of 1/3.
3.3.7.2

Application of the PROMETHEE II Theory
The responses are assessed based on the PROMETHEE II theory. We further

discuss the steps involved in its application.
3.3.7.2.1

Preference degree and its evaluation:

The appropriateness of each response in relation to other criterion is established.
The variation between two security procedures u and u depends upon the pair-wise
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comparison between dr (u, u) and g r (u ) . They indicate the assessment value of action u for
criteria r . Here U is a set of all security procedures.

(u, u U )(r  R)dr (u, u)  gr (u)  gr (u)

(3.4)

where R is the set of criteria.
3.3.7.2.2

Preference function and its selection:

The PROMETHEE II method supports six types of preferential functions. They
are Usual, Quasi, V-Shape, Level, U-Shape with Indifference and Gaussian Criterion[97].
The choice of the preference function is made by the system administrator. These
preferential functions translate the difference between evaluations obtained by two
responses u and u  into a preference degree ranging from zero to one given by,

Pr (u, u)  Fr (dj (u, u))

(3.5)

where Fr (dj) is the preferential function for criterion r , and P is the preference degree
criterion r .
3.3.7.2.3

Global preference index and its calculation:

Weight of a criterion decides the relevance of the criterion. Based on these
weights the most appropriate protection method is chosen. Evaluating two criteria at a
time, the preference of security response u over u is defined as the weighted sum of
preferential functions for every criterion. In this experiment, all eight responses are
equally significant and each assigned an initial weight of 1/3.
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 (u, u)  wr Pr (u, u)
rR

3.3.7.2.4

(3.6)

Positive and negative outranking flows and their calculation:

For each response u U , the positive (negative) outranking flow denotes a
higher (lower) level of response, when compared to other responses. The following
equations show the positive



and negative   outranking flows. The net outranking flow

 is the difference between the positive and the negative outranking flows.

  (u ) 

1
 (u, u j )
n  1 uU

(3.7)

  (u) 

1
 (u j , u)
n  1 uU

(3.8)

 (u)    (u)    (u)

(3.9)

where  indicates the total outranking flow value of a response. Superior responses have
higher  outranking flow values. The expenses incurred on a response u are inversely
proportional to its net outranking flow value. Expenses can be denoted as  . The
minimum value u corresponds to the best response. For instance, to mitigate FCS
attacks, the best response selected is “dropping malicious commands”. This response has
the least outranking flow value when compared to other responses. If the chosen response
is not adequate to mitigate the attack, it is understood that the attack identification was
flawed. The second best response is then implemented to attain normalcy.
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3.3.8

The Intrusion Response System (IRS)
MAC evaluates responses and communicates the best response to the IRS. The

IRS module mounted on the front VM initiates the response to protect the system against
the detected threat.
The developed responses are subsequently described here. “Packet Filtering”
protection method blocks traffic directed to a port on the victim machine. For example, if
an attack is detected in a Modbus/TCP network, traffic from the attacker machine
directed to port 502 is blocked. Ethernet port 502 is chosen because it is reserved for
Modbus/TCP protocol. Traffic to the victim machine is blocked using iptables, netfilter
and firewall rules. This protection method is useful in a DoS attack scenario because it is
impossible to drop every attack packet in the network.
“Replacement of Compromised Devices” protection method starts a new slave to
respond to the masters’ requests. The front VM sends control commands to the victim
slave to shutdown and start another slave on the network. This protection method is used
to protect against injection attacks. If a register value in the slave gets modified, wrong
process parameters are sent to the HMI. To mitigate the attack, a new slave with default
process parameters is started on the network.
“Dropping of Malicious Packets” protection method uses the Snort Intrusion
Prevention System (IPS) to drop attack packets. Snort has a rules file to identify
malicious packets. It drops packets triggering a rule and blocks traffic to the slave from
the attacker machine.
“One time Authentication” is a protection method that verifies the authenticity of
a new device requesting information from the slave. For example, if the master is not
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authenticated, the slave does not respond to its requests. This response is useful in an
FCS attack scenario because an attacker cannot even obtain slave information without
authentication.
“Serial Port Disconnection” is a protection method where the virtual serial port of
the victim machine is disabled to disconnect all communications with other devices in the
network.
“Network Disconnection” is a response where network adapters of the victim
machine are disabled. This disconnects communication between the victim and other
devices in the network. Depending on the network topology, communication between
other devices can also be disrupted.
“Isolation of Compromised Devices” is a response where the infected machines
are isolated to avoid infecting other machines in the network. More than one protection
method is launched to completely disconnect them from the remaining devices in the
network.
“Termination of Physical Processes” is another important protection method
where processes running on a machine are killed by the MC-VM. For example, if the
forecaster predicts an attack exploiting the server, the MC-VM kills bash processes
running on the device to avoid the attack. In this case, the attacker cannot initiate a
connection with the slave as the process is already killed by the MC-VM.
“Host Shutdown” response is initiated as a last resort if none of the responses are
able to restore normal system operations in the compromised device. The MC-VM issues
a command to shutdown the compromised device in order to prevent infecting other
devices in the network.
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In conclusion, the security management framework defends against network
attacks in an ICS environment. The proposed structure detects and classifies attacks
applying data mining techniques. Depending on the type of attack and the current
security state of the system, protection methods are evaluated by the MAC based on the
fuzzy logic and PROMETHEE II methods. The learning module collects real-time data
continuously for forensic analysis to defend against unknown attacks[33][92]. All these
components of the framework are mounted on the MC-VM, which is configured to
operate in the computing environment.
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CHAPTER IV
EVALUATION

In this research, the concept of autonomic computing is used in the development
of the model-based self-protecting framework to predict, detect and protect ICS from
cyber attacks with little or no human intervention. In this chapter, the goal is to launch
attacks on a water storage tank control system to verify and validate self-protection in the
proposed framework.
To achieve this goal, we developed SCADA-specific cyber attacks such as
function code scanning, malicious state command injection, malicious parameter
command injection, and denial of service. FCS, MSCI and DoS attack signatures are
added to the IDS dataset, which are then identified by it as known attacks. To validate
unknown attacks, the MPCI attack signature is not added to the IDS dataset. Web-based
attacks are not studied because of an air-gap between the control and corporate networks.
A typical ICS network is setup to launch these attacks as discussed in the next
section.
4.1

Experimental Setup and Configuration Settings
The experimental setup consists of a serial-based ICS which manages and

supervises a gas pipeline and water tank control system. The master, slave, and serial
VMs are deployed in the network. These devices are connected using virtual serial ports
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and pipes. Every device in the network is configured to have two network adapters. Their
IP addresses, subnet masks and Ethernet ports are configured to be on the same network.
After initial configuration, communication between MTU and RTU is tested using ping
and telnet protocols. This is ascertained by inspecting the connection between network
adapters.
The network is setup in such a manner to avoid network connection errors like
host unreachable and Time to live (TTL) expired in transit. Such network errors occur
when one machine is able to ping another machine but the reverse is not true. This is
caused when Ethernet 0 on the pinging device is within the network, whereas Ethernet 1
is not configured to be on the same subnet.
IP address of the central slave is often hard-coded into the masters in an ICS
network. In the virtual testbed used in this research, configuration settings of the masters
are altered to remove the hard-coded IP address of the central slave. This is because when
the slave is attacked, “replacement of compromised devices” protection method can be
initiated to start another slave on the network isolating the compromised slave. Hence,
hard-coding the address of the central slave is avoided so that the master can connect to a
slave with a different IP address if the existing slave in the network is compromised.
4.2

Demonstration of the Water Tank Testbed
This section presents a case study of a water tank control system. In an ICS

network, master and slave communicate with each other to remain abreast with current
process parameters. In the virtual testbed, communication between master and slave is
routed via the serial VM. When master sends Modbus RTU requests to the slave, the
serial VM converts RTU messages to Modbus TCP/IP by wrapping the MBAP TCP/IP
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header around the Modbus RTU message payload. It then sends the request to the slave
which responds to it in Modbus RTU format. The serial VM converts the response to
Modbus TCP/IP and forwards it to the master.

Figure 4.1

Normal Water Tank Control System Operation

Figure 4 presents the case of normal operation in a water tank control system in
automatic mode. Here, the water level increases gradually until it reaches the setpoint
value and is maintained between the high and low setting. In this CS, water level is
measured as the percentage of the volume of tank filled. In our case, the high setpoint
value is set to be 60% and the low setpoint value is 50%. The high and low alarm levels
are 80% and 30% respectively. The slave continuously updates the Front VM with the
current water level values in real-time. These values are sent from the slave to the Front
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VM by computer networking services such as Netcat. The Front VM processes this
information and determines the current security state of the system. If the slave is
compromised, the Front VM initiates protection methods to restore normal system
operations.
4.3

Validation of Self-Protection in the ASM Framework
To accomplish the goal of self-protection in ICS, we developed a MC-VM

(described in section 3.3) that operates in stealth mode. ASM framework modules are
configured on the MC-VM which is then introduced into the network. All or a few of the
framework modules can be deployed in the control network to improve the security of the
system. These modules directly interact with each other to secure ICS from cyber threats
[81].
An attack VM is authenticated to connect to the network. We assume the attacker
has prior network knowledge and is an insider with default gateway, subnet mask and IP
address adjusted to gain access to the network. We also assume the attacker surpassed the
“one time authentication” protection method and gained access to query the slave. On
gaining access, attacks such as scanning, denial-of-service, and injection are launched
from the attack VM to validate the security provided by the MC-VM.
Every inbound packet is analyzed by the MC-VM through deep packet inspection
by using Wireshark. First, the MC-VM executes deep packet inspection analyzing
inbound packets and data exchange rates by using Wireshark. Both TCP and UDP
packets directed to the slave are thoroughly analyzed by this packet analyzer. In most
cases, the payload length of attack packets is higher (or lower) than that of normal
packets exchanged between RTU and MTU. This distinction is identified by deep packet
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inspection using which attack packets are detected. After detection of attack packets,
using the Modbus frame format in addition to the memory map of the slave device, the
MC-VM identifies process parameters requested by an attacker. Based on the identified
process parameters, the target of the attacker is revealed. Depending on the criticality of
the target and the type of attack suspected, protection methods to secure the system are
launched.
4.3.1

Demonstration of Injection Attacks and Protection Method - Network
Disconnection
The purpose of injection attacks is to overwrite remote terminal registers in the

slave by injecting packets with incorrect process parameters into the network. Injection
attacks manipulate data in the register altering control process values resulting in
disruption of regular system operations [98]. We demonstrate and predict injection
attacks on the ICS testbed.
In this experiment, the water tank testbed is started in automatic mode
maintaining the water level between the given high and low setpoint values. As an
attacker, we inject modbus command packets in the network addressed to the slave.
Packets containing incorrect process parameters are sent at higher rate to the slave when
compared to the communication rate of the legitimate master. This overwhelms the
regular communication between the legitimate master and slave causing it to accept the
deceptive command packets. As a result, the slave alters register values associated with
the water level. Due to this alteration, the water level instantly increases beyond the high
alarm point. As shown in Figure 5, after 65 seconds, the attack raises the water level
beyond the high alarm setting. Packets forcing the water level to fall below the low alarm
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level are also injected into the network causing the water level to fall below the low alarm
point after 140 seconds. The figure also illustrates the forecasted water level value which
indicates the predicted water level precedes the actual water value by 10 ms.

Figure 4.2

Observation and Prediction of the Water Level in the Water Tank CS under
MPCI Attack

Since MPCI is treated as an unknown attack, the IDS cannot identify the type of
attack and classifies the system state as “Abnormal”. On identification of the system state
as “Abnormal”, the “live” forensic analysis module examines the attack packets. FAM
extracts the MPCI attack signatures and updates detection algorithms, so that the IDS can
identify MPCI as a known attack in the future. The attack signature is also updated in the
IRS enabling it to determine the best protection method to be launched to secure the
system from the attack. For example, in a water storage tank control system, attack
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signature like the water level value is extracted from the attack packets and studied. Out
of the eight protection methods, the best method is chosen.
Table 4.1

Assessment of Recommended Responses Example for Injection Attacks

Ranking

Response

C1

C2

C3

C4

Total Value
(Auto or Semi-Auto)

1

Network Disconnection

0

0.5

0.4

0.2

0.0931
(Auto)

2

Dropping Malicious Packets

0

0.8

1

1

0.0693
(Semi-Auto)

3

Isolation of Compromised
Devices

0.3

0.8

0.4

0.6

0.0398
(Auto)

4

Replacement of
Compromised Devices

0

1

0

0.6

-0.0157
(Auto)

5

One time Authentication

0.5

0.5

0.2

0.2

-0.0180
(Semi-Auto)

6

Termination of Physical
Processes

0

1

1

1

-0.0418
(Semi-Auto)

7

Serial Port Disconnection

0

0.8

0.8

1

-0.0530
(Semi-Auto)

8

Packet Filtering

0.5

0.3

0

0.2

-0.0736
(Semi-Auto)

According to the type of attack, protection methods are ranked based on their
outranking flow values. As shown in Table 1, for injection attacks, “Network
Disconnection” is chosen as the best protection method by the MAC. This protection
method disables network adapters on the slave device, so that the injected attack packets
cannot reach the slave. After the launch of “Network Disconnection” protection method,

63

the water tank CS is reverted to “Auto” mode maintaining the water level within the
normal region of operation.
“Network Disconnection” is chosen as the best protection method because MPCI
attack injects several attack packets into the network. If the number of attack packets
injected are comparatively less then “Dropping of Malicious Packets” protection method
can be used for securing the system.
4.3.2

Demonstration of DoS attack and Protection Method - Packet Filtering
Denial of Service attacks target the availability security component of the system.

They are carried out by uninterrupted transmission of packets to the slave until
exhaustion of its resources. To cause a DoS attack in an ICS network, an intruder
generates a burst of packets using a packet generator and injects them into the network
affecting the communication between the master and slave.

Figure 4.3

Illustration of the Packet Filtering Protection Method
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As shown in Figure 6, the DoS attack is launched after 100 seconds. The attack
packets disrupt normal operations in the network and change the mode of operation from
automatic mode to manual mode. In this mode, without operator control, the water level
rises indefinitely. Within 8 seconds, IDS detects the attack and IRS initiates the best
protection method to restore normal system operations.
Table 4.2

Assessment of suggested responses for Denial of Service attacks
Total Value
(Auto or SemiAuto)
0.0931
(Auto)

Ranking

Response

C1

C2

C3

C4

1

Packet Filtering

0

0.5

0.4

0.2

2

Isolation of Compromised
Devices

0

0.8

1

1

0.0693
(Semi-Auto)

3

Termination of Physical
Processes

0.3

0.8

0.4

0.6

0.0398
(Auto)

4

Replacement of Compromised
Devices

0

1

0

0.6

-0.0157
(Auto)

5

One time Authentication

0.5

0.5

0.2

0.2

6

Network Disconnection

0

1

1

1

7

Serial Port Disconnection

0

0.8

0.8

1

8

Dropping Malicious Packets

0.5

0.3

0

0.2

-0.0180
(Semi-Auto)
-0.0418
(Semi-Auto)
-0.0530
(Semi-Auto)
-0.0736
(Semi-Auto)

As shown in Table 2, in case of DoS attacks, “Packet Filtering” is chosen as the
best protection method. This method uses predefined chains in iptables and nftables to
block traffic to a port. Iptable rules are written to block the IP address of the attacker,
which is identified by the forensic analysis module. For example, if the attacker exploits a
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Modbus/TCP slave device, rules to block the attacker from accessing port 502 are
written. In this case, legitimate users continue to query the slave while the attacker is
blocked access to the port.
Other protection methods such as, “Isolation of Compromised Devices” and
“Termination of Physical Processes” are not chosen as the best response because these
methods do not block the IP address of the attacker. They either start a new device to
replace the compromised device or terminate processes running on the victim VM.
The IP address of the attacker should be blocked to prevent other devices in the
network from being exploited. However, the attacker can readily alter the DoS attack
code and construct packets with a different source IP address, thus continuing to cause
network congestion.
4.3.3

Demonstration of Scanning Attack and Protection Method - Dropping of
Malicious Packets
Scanning attacks collect device-specific information. An FCS attack obtains

information about the supported function codes on a Modbus slave. Their goal is to
obtain system information without being detected and disrupting normal system
operations.
In this research, FCS packets are created using user-defined function codes and
empty payloads [99]. The function code field in each Modbus RTU command packet is
one byte long. The value in this field is set within the allowed range of function codes
i.e., [1, 43] by the attacker. This packet is then used to query the slave. Since a packet can
contain one function code value, each query can determine if that specific function code
is supported on the slave. When a function code is not supported by the slave, an invalid
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function code response is obtained. Responses from the slave are analyzed using
Wireshark. By analyzing the slave’s response, an attacker can determine the supported
function codes on the slave.
Allowing unnecessary function codes on a Modbus slave can reveal additional
device and network information in case of an attack. To prevent leakage of information to
the attacker, function codes that are not required for system operation are disabled on the
Modbus slave such that it only supports the required function codes. For example,
Modbus function code 08 restarts communications on the slave. In this research, function
code 08 is disabled because it disrupts the communication between the slave and master
in the network. As a result, the slave does not get updated with current process
parameters of the system.
Consider a case where an attack is launched to raise the water level in the water
storage tank CS beyond the high alarm point. To avoid detection of the attack, the
attacker can restart communications on the slave using function code 08. The slave
remains unaware about the rise in the water level because the communication between
the slave and the master is disrupted. Hence, function codes not required for network
operation should be disabled on the slave.
In case of FCS attacks, “Dropping of Malicious Packets” is chosen as the best
protection method by MAC. This protection method uses the Snort Intrusion Prevention
System (IPS) to drop attack packets. Based on the rules, Snort detects and drops packets
with malicious function codes. For example, packets with function code 08, which restart
communications on the slave, are dropped by the Snort IPS. “Dropping of Malicious
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Packets” protection method does not affect normal system operations and hence is
executed automatically by the IRS without the approval of the operator.

Figure 4.4

Observation and Prediction of Number of Attack Packets Dropped by Snort
IPS

Figure 7 shows the observation and prediction of the number of FCS attack
packets dropped by Snort. These dropped attack packets start increasing from 150 ms
showing that the MC-VM detected an FCS attack and launched the “Dropping of
Malicious Packets” protection method to secure the system. The figure also illustrates
predictions given by the forecaster. The predictions show that the number of packets
being dropped is going to increase in the future. This confirms that the slave is under
scanning attack and the protection method is able to drop the attack packets continuously.
Therefore, supported function codes on the slave cannot be determined by the attacker.
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Table 4.3

Assessment of suggested responses for Scanning attacks

Ranking

Response

C1

C2

C3

C4

1

Dropping of Malicious
Packets

0

0.5

0.4

0.2

2

Serial Port Disconnection

0

1

0

0.6

3

Packet Filtering

0.5

0.3

0

0.2

4

One time Authentication

0.5

0.5

0.2

0.2

5

Replacement of
Compromised Devices

0

0.8

0.8

1

6

Network Disconnection

0

0.8

1

1

7

Isolation of Compromised
Devices

0.3

0.8

0.4

0.6

8

Termination of Physical
Processes

0

1

1

1

Total Value
(Auto or SemiAuto)
0.0931
(Auto)
0.0693
(Semi-Auto)
0.0398
(Auto)
-0.0157
(Auto)
-0.0180
(Semi-Auto)
-0.0418
(Semi-Auto)
-0.0530
(Semi-Auto)
-0.0736
(Semi-Auto)

As shown in Table 3, “Serial Port Disconnection” is not chosen as the best
response because disabling serial ports disrupts communication between devices in the
network. This is because the ICS virtual testbed is serial-based and uses Modbus/TCP, a
serial communication protocol. Hence, in case of FCS attacks, “Dropping of Malicious
Packets” is chosen as the best protection method as it drops attack packets without
disrupting communications in the network.
Experimental results prove that the projected ASM framework effectively
accomplishes the self-protection attribute and mitigates cyber attacks improving security
in the water storage tank CS with little or no human intervention. It secures the CS from
both known and unknown attacks. It also strengthens the control system security by
69

launching protection methods autonomously reducing protection time delays. Therefore,
the ASM framework successfully predicts, identifies, evaluates, and protects against
cyber attacks.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

5.1

Summary
Security threats on a network can originate from several sources. These include,

but are not limited to, antagonistic sources such as disgruntled employees, contentious
governments, terrorist groups, and natural sources like human errors, and system
complexities [100]. Viruses spread swiftly infecting thousands of computers. In case of
an attack, there is a need to transmit the security breach information quickly throughout
the network. This action warns the other machines connected to the network to keep their
anti-virus software up-to-date [101]. Information regarding a possible attack greatly helps
protect other machines in the network considering that an attacker uses multiple attack
tactics to break into a system of interest.
To develop an efficient security solution, a complete threat scope analysis of the
system is required. Vulnerable functions affecting system operation should be identified.
This analysis is useful in penetration testing, as it provides an understanding of possible
ways a system can be exploited. For example, intruders send emails containing malicious
attachments which if downloaded infect the computer’s file system. Intruders can also
launch exploits that identify browser plugins installed on a computer to predict the best
attack to break into the machine [102].
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The ASM framework provides an efficient security solution to protect SCADA
systems from cyber intrusions. To validate our approach, two master controller machines
are placed in the control network and the field network. Following this setup, the gas
pipeline and the water storage tank ICS testbeds are attacked. Two different types of
injection attacks, a scanning attack and a DoS attack are developed to exploit the control
systems. Responses are evaluated in a spoofing attack scenario on the tank system. To
protect the system, “replacement of compromised devices” protection method is chosen
as the best response by the MAC. In this protection method, the master controller
machine sends instructions to the host machine to start another server. The new server
begins responding to client’s requests isolating the compromised server from the network
[33]. This protection method needs operator approval as a disruption in the normal
system operation occurs during its execution.
Experimental results proved the ASM structure identifies vulnerabilities and
enhances system security [32]. Remaining responses are not executed to defend against
the spoofing attack on the ICS network because their total outranking flow value is lower
when compared to the “replacement of compromised devices” protection method. The
ASM framework is tested on the gas pipeline and the water storage tank models and can
be deployed in other ICS networks with little or no changes to the configuration.
5.2

Scope for Improvements and Future Work
Until recent years, most of the research effort in the SCADA security area

concentrated focused on protecting the system against abrupt failures. Currently, there is
an increasing need to better protect every aspect of the ICS network. Since the Stuxnet,
several groups such as the Department of Energy (DoE) and the Department of Defense
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(DoD) started inspecting every detail of the SCADA environment. The impact on even
the most basic equipment was analyzed in this process. For instance, access control issues
in wireless sensors employed for monitoring control processes in an ICS environment
were resolved using hop-to-hop confidentiality solutions[103][104].
Risk assessment, effective threat detection and network forensic analysis are a
few areas where the ASM framework can be improved. A better forensic analysis tool
with the ability of inspecting log files, user activities and network flows is desired.
Honeypot systems can be setup to gather attack data and widen the signature dataset for
the IDS. The main goal is to efficiently detect an attack. For instance, the system should
recognize a possible DoS attack if a legitimate client does not have access to a service
they normally had access to.
Better protection methods can be developed to improve the IRS. Snort IPS is used
for attack detection only in specific cases. For example, consider a network with
extremely high amount of traffic and specific Snort rules allowing only legitimate access
to the system resources. In this case of high traffic, with several Snort rules checking
packet contents, the ability of Snort to raise alarms or drop malicious packets can get
compromised [105].
For improved information exchange among network components, integrity is an
important aspect that needs to be incorporated in communication protocols used in the
network. A key interchange mechanism can be implemented between the communicating
parties. However, it is necessary to maintain the key size to a reasonable level because
older PLCs and HMIs were not built to handle high computational needs. Additionally,
generating attack paths, compromising graphs, and estimating risk reduction are
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techniques to further improve the integrity of data evaluation by the ASM framework
modules [106]. This avoids the manipulation of data being transmitted from sensors to
detection systems.
Development of communication patterns in the network and inspection of
anomalies in these patterns can be used for attack detection. Techniques to monitor
servers in the network can also be realized. These methods should detect if a server is
down and restore its normal operation as quickly as possible. This work can be further
extended to record the number of RTUs connected to the network. Using this technique, a
new client connected to the network can be detected due to the deviation in
communication patterns observed in the network. The deviation is caused because of a
new workstation operating in the environment [107]. Depending on the type of
information requested by the new client (from the server), it is classified as a legitimate
or an illegitimate user.
Similar to communication patterns, security patterns can also be applied to the
ICS network. Calculation of security patterns for the central controller and field devices
is used in determining where access control policies are needed in the software cycle. To
generate accurate calculations, several other constraints can be added to the security
patterns depending on the type of network topology in use. Physical access control
strategies can also be combined with this method making it useful in regulating the traffic
flow in a SCADA network [108].
Risk assessment and penetration testing can be made autonomic in our ASM
framework. Real-time analysis of security vulnerabilities of the system is required. This
assists in protecting the ICS network against effortless attacks like the UDP scanning
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attack. In addition, the intelligence paradigm can be applied to the framework to support
self-response mechanisms if field devices such as PLCs are attacked. This is important
because if incorrect process parameters are sent to the server, no protection method is
initiated as the detection module does not classify the current system state as abnormal.
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